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Stock markets around the globe often move 
in lockstep. The US market’s direction in par-
ticular can add or subtract billions in value from 
stocks in other countries in a single day (Cheol 
Eun and Sangdal Shim 1989). Between many 
country indices, correlations are now relatively 
high (0.8 or above). Yet only a few decades ago, 
it was widely noted that correlations between 
stock markets were low (Herbert Grubel 1968; 
Haim  Levy  and  Marshall  Sarnat  1970).  That 
correlations are not constant over time has been 
highlighted, inter alia, by William Goetzmann, 
Lingfen  Li,  and  Geert  Rouwenhoorst  (2005). 
Higher  correlations  spell  lower  diversifica-
tion  benefits.  If  markets  fluctuate  in  parallel, 
the  advantages  of  moving  money  into  over-
seas markets will be much smaller than previ-
ously thought—the “home bias” puzzle may be 
smaller than advertised.
In this paper, we use a unique long-run data-
set of regulatory constraints on capital account 
openness to explain stock market correlations. 
Since stock returns themselves are highly vola-
tile,  any  examination  of  what  drives  correla-
tions needs to focus on long runs of data. This 
is particularly true since some of the short-term 
changes  in  co-movements  appear  to  reverse 
themselves  (Delroy  Hunter  2005).  We  argue 
that  changes  in  the  co-movement  of  indices 
have not been random. Rather, they are mainly 
driven by greater freedom to move funds from 
one country to another. In related work, Geert 
Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that 
equity correlations increase after liberalization 
of capital markets, using a number of case stud-
ies from emerging countries. We examine this 
pattern systematically for the last century, and 
find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. 
We compare the importance of capital account 
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openness  with  one  main  alternative  explana-
tion, the growing synchronization of economic 
fundamentals. We conclude that greater open-
ness has been the single most important cause 
of growing correlations during the last quarter 
of a century, though increasingly correlated eco-
nomic fundamentals also matter. In the conclu-
sion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects 
of greater openness appear to be so much stron-
ger today than they were during the last era of 
globalization before 1914.
I.  Data
Freedom to move capital from one country 
to  another  was  commonplace  a  century  ago. 
Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor (2003) 
argue that nineteenth-century capital markets 
were at least as globalized as markets today. 
John Maynard Keynes (1920), in describing the 
delights of life before 1914, highlighted the ease 
with which funds were moved around the globe:
“The  inhabitant  of  London  could  order 
by telephone, sipping his morning tea in 
bed,  the  various  products  of  the  whole 
earth … He  could … by  the  same  means 
adventure his wealth in … new enterprises 
of  any  quarter  of  the  world,  and  share, 
without exertion or even trouble, in their 
prospective fruits. …”
World War I saw heavy restrictions placed on 
the  movement  of  funds.  While  the  interwar 
period saw liberalization, it was only beginning 
to  approach  prewar  levels  of  capital  account 
openness before the twin shocks of the Great 
Depression and World War II shut down capi-
tal flows. The Bretton Woods system initially 
envisaged no role for free flows across borders. 
Keynes argued that the experience of the World 
Economic Crisis in the early 1930s had made 
it  clear  that  while  travel  and  trade  should  be 
free,  capital  transfers  should  be  permanently 
restricted. The postwar period consequently saw 
a very slow and gradual return to current and 
capital account openness. Problems in ensuring 
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an  adequate  supply  of  dollars  in  war-ravaged 
Europe added an extra note of caution (Barry 
Eichengreen 2006). While some countries like 
the United States and Germany had dismantled 
many controls by the early 1960s, others such as 
the United Kingdom and Japan continued with 
massive interventions. Even after the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, many countries 
maintained  various  restrictions.  The  United 
Kingdom  did  not  eliminate  remaining  capital 
controls  until  after  the  election  of  Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979. On the European continent, it 
took until the run-up to the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) to see the elimination of many 
restrictions that had stayed in place.
Capturing the history of capital account open-
ness in a single indicator is not straightforward. 
For the recent past, codings based on the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions have 
become widely accepted.
1 We extend the existing 
series back to the late nineteenth century, using 
the standard coding scheme underlying the so-
called Quinn-Toyoda measure of openness for a 
set of 16 developed countries. (See Quinn (1997, 
2003) for descriptions.) Our unit of observation 
is the average openness in each country pair. In 
our dataset, openness ranges from a minimum 
of 0 to a maximum of 100, with an average of 
76. There is marked variation in the variable, as 
indicated by a standard deviation of 23. The late 
nineteenth century has nearly completely open 
markets, as does the early twenty-first century 
(Table 1).
We combine these data with stock return cor-
relations over the last century. We use the cor-
relations of returns in nonoverlapping four-year 
1  See Eichengreen and Michael Bordo (1997).
Table 1—Capital Account Openness over the Last Century
Period Mean N Minimum Maximum
1890   96 114   50 100
1894 100 114 100 100
1898 100 114 100 100
1902 100 114 100 100
1906 100 114 100 100
1910 100 114 100 100
1914   93 114   75 100
1918 66 120 42 94
1922 57 120 19 90.5
1926 85 120 19 100
1930 70 120 15.5 100
1934 56 120 0 90.5
1938 50 120 0 87.5
1942 NA NA NA NA
1946 25 105 0 100
1950 45 120 3 100
1954 57 120 11 100
1958 65 120 22 100
1962 67 120 25.5 100
1966 66 120 31.5 100
1970 67 120 38 98.5
1974 68 120 38 100
1978 72 120 48.5 98.5
1982 77 120 53 100
1986 85 120 64 100
1990 93 120 75 100
1994 95 120 75 100
1998 97 120 81.5 100
Total 76 3,183 0 100
Notes: See text for sources. The countries represented are Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Zero represents a closed 
economy, 100 represents a completely open economy. N is number of country pairs.VOL. 98 NO. 2 537 A CENtuRY Of GLOBAL EquItY MARkEt CORRELAtIONS
periods in 120 country pairs. Returns are calcu-
lated as log difference of monthly index values 
for main country indices such as the CDAX for 
Germany or the long-run equivalent of the  S&P 
500. As in other recent work on long-run return 
patterns (Eichengreen and Hui Tong 2003), we 
use  data  from  the  Global  Financial  Database 
(GFD) (2006). Where superior national sources 
exist—such as in the case of Germany—we use 
these instead.
2
Figure 1 shows the variable that we are seek-
ing to explain—the average of the correlation 
coefficients in our dyads. The early twentieth- 
century shows a high in correlations of 0.4, and 
a downturn even before World War I. The inter-
war period returns to this level of co-movement   
immediately  before  the  onset  of  the  Great 
Depression. The postwar period initially shows 
very low correlations. The early twentieth-cen-
tury high is surpassed only in the mid-1980s. 
From the early 1990s, stock market correlations 
are at record levels, with each period showing 
covariances higher than the last one.
2  Details available from the authors upon request.
II.  Data Analysis
We find strong evidence that country pairs 
that are more open to capital flows also show 
greater  co-movement  of  their  stock  markets. 
Both time series and cross-sectional evidence 
indicate  a  sizeable  impact  of  capital  account 
openness.
Regressions take the form
(1)    ri, t 5 ai 1 bqi, t 1 gX9 i, t 1 e ,
where r is the correlation coefficient of main 
stock market indices in country pair i at time t, a 
is the intercept, q is the Quinn-Toyoda measure 
of openness introduced earlier, and X is a set of 
control variables. Table 2 shows the basic results. 
We find a large and highly significant coefficient 
in our pooled sample. On average, countries that 
raised their openness from the twenty-fifth to 
the  seventy-fifth  percentile  of  the  distribution 
saw an increase in the correlation of their stock 
markets by 0.2, equivalent to a rise of 59 percent 
relative to the sample mean in our dataset (0.32). 
Controlling  for  unobserved  effects  by  adding 
time and country pair dummies improves the fit 
of our regressions. It also lowers the coefficient 









































Figure 1: Stock Market Correlations over the Long Run
(Shaded areas indicate observations reflecting stock returns affected by the two world wars)MAY 2008 538 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
we obtain a coefficient that is less than a third 
the size in the naïve specification. Nonetheless, 
the impact of openness remains large and statis-
tically significant. Going from the twenty-fifth 
to the seventy-fifth percentile of openness now 
adds 0.05 to correlations. In related work, we 
also find an effect of the difference in capital 
account openness between countries, even after 
holding constant average openness in each dyad 
(Quinn and Voth 2007). Even if we assume that 
all time series variation is not useful for our pur-
poses, leaving only cross-sectional variation to 
identify the effect of openness, the connection 
appears large and tightly estimated.
If  multinational  firms  (MNFs)  provide  an 
effective means of international diversification, 
as  some  authors  have  argued  (Tamir  Agmon 
and Donald Lessard 1977), our results represent 
a lower bound of the true effect of cross-border 
capital flows on covariances. True liberalization 
would have risen less sharply than our indica-
tors.  If  prior  to  the  repeal  of  controls,  some 
capital  flows  took  the  form  of  FDI,  and  co-
  movements increased because the MNFs listed 
in one country do business in another, our esti-
mation approach will understate the true effect 
of liberalization. Subsequent work by Randall 
Morck and Bernard Yeung (1991) also suggested 
that investors do not value MNFs as an alterna-
tive way to diversify their portfolios.
Are the effects in Table 2 causal? We want 
to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  real 
economic  variables  might  have  become  more 
synchronized, causing greater co-movement of 
stock market indices. Controlling for all relevant 
fundamentals is an impossible task. We use the 
variables that are available consistently over the 
period of our study. Our macroeconomic con-
trols are the correlation of GDP growth rates, 
interest rates, and bilateral trade flows. All these 
variables have the predicted sign. Adding the 
macro controls has a negligible influence on the 
size and significance of the openness variable.
An additional concern is that convergence in 
macroeconomic indicators may by itself raise 
the  likelihood  of  liberalization.  We  attempt 
to  address  the  issue  through  IV  estimation. 
The EMU led to a sharp change in regime for 
European  countries  that  retained  some  con-
trols into the 1990s, such as Italy, Spain, and 
France. We use EMU membership as an instru-
ment for capital account openness in the final 
four lines in Table 2. It takes the value one for 
members between 1994 and 1999, when deci-
sions on the final set of countries joining EMU 
were made.
3 The idea is to capture a change in 
3 We also experimented with a specification that set the 
variable to one for all member states from 1992 onward, or 
from 1996. The results are largely unchanged. 
Table 2—Effect of Capital Account Openness on Stock Market Correlations
1. Specification 2. Coefficient on Q
3. Impact of raising Q
from 25th to 75th 
percentile
OLS
  No fixed effects 0.59 127.762 0.19 1159 percent2
  Pair dummy 0.57 125.902 0.18 1154 percent2
  Pair 1 time dummies 0.15 14.982 0.05 1114 percent2
  Macro controls 1  0.14 14.892 0.04 1113 percent2
    pair 1 time dummies
IV
  No fixed effects 1.18 117.062 0.37 11112 percent2
  Pair dummy 1.19 119.492 0.37 11113 percent2
  Pair and time dummies 1.06 12.292 0.33 11101 percent2
  Macro controls 1 1.02 12.092 0.32 1197 percent2
    pair 1 time dummies
Notes: Q is the Quinn-Toyoda measure of capital account openness. The macro controls 
are interest rate correlation, GDP growth rate correlation, and bilateral trade volume. The 
t-statistic is in parentheses in column 2. The effect in parentheses in column 3 is calculated 
relative to the sample mean, which is 0.33. The sample in all models contains 2,073 obser-
vations. The instrument for Q is EMU membership from 1994 onward. All estimation is for 
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openness imposed on countries as a condition 
for EMU membership, and one they would not 
have taken anyway as a result of growing cor-
relations of fundamentals. The exclusion restric-
tion that has to be valid for the IV exercise to be 
useful is that stock market correlations during 
the run-up to monetary union will not be influ-
enced by future EMU membership, other than 
through greater openness. This seems plausible. 
However, if anticipation effects led to growing 
  synchronization in the stock markets of future 
EMU members during the 1994–1999 period, 
our IV strategy would be invalid.
The IV results in general show lower statisti-
cal significance—as expected—but larger coef-
ficients. This may seem surprising. Two factors 
may be at work. First, it is possible that using 
the EMU dummy solves a measurement prob-
lem  in  our  openness  index.  We  do  not  know 
with  certainty  which  elements  in  the  capital 
account openness measure are relevant for cor-
relations. Also, an increase by, say, ten points on 
the Quinn-Toyoda scale in one country may be 
driven by changes relevant to equity purchases 
and sales; in another, the restrictions repealed 
may have little to do with portfolio flows (relat-
ing,  say,  to  FDI  but  not  to  portfolio  transac-
tions). Since EMU membership often led to a 
cancelling of rules that had shut national capi-
tal  markets  to  portfolio  flows,  the  instrument 
may capture the more relevant part of overall 
variation. A second interpretation is that EMU 
itself  boosted  stock  market  synchronization, 
even controlling for fundamentals, since market 
participants  expected  future  fundamentals  to 
be moving in lockstep. In the latter case, EMU 
would have influenced correlations in a way that 
is unrelated to capital account openness, and our 
IV strategy would be invalid. Since fundamen-
tals have not converged markedly after EMU, 
we are not convinced that the big leap in intra-
European stock market correlations in the 1990s 
should be attributed to anticipation effects of an 
economic development that never took place.
III.  Conclusions
Over the last century, capital account liberal-
izations have been accompanied by higher cor-
relations of national stock markets with those 
abroad. Also, open countries have maintained 
higher correlation levels than closed ones. If our 
argument  that  capital  account  openness  itself 
raises  covariances  is  correct,  it  implies  that 
diversification benefits in the future cannot be 
as high as many scholars writing in the 1960s 
predicted. Rather, as more and more countries 
open  up  to  outside  capital,  the  benefits  from 
diversification are likely to decline. The “home 
bias puzzle” will be commensurately smaller. It 
is still possible that investors who are among the 
first to put their money into newly open mar-
kets can benefit from uncorrelated returns for a 
while. Further, high returns appear to follow lib-
eralizations (Peter B. Henry 2000). Yet over the 
long run, diversification benefits may be small, 
provided a significant number of investors chase 
them.
Our data also reveal a puzzle. Why, if openness 
is so important for equity market correlations, 
did nineteenth-century stock markets move in 
different directions with such frequency? One 
possible reason is that economic fundamentals 
themselves were only slightly correlated during 
the nineteenth century; growth correlations in 
our sample were very low during the 1890–1913 
period 120.002 on average2, but are relatively 
high 10.422 in the contemporary period. Another 
possibility is that our data for the earliest period 
are particularly imperfect, and this may be par-
tially  responsible  for  the  low  correlations  we 
document.  To  the  extent  that  data  limitations 
are not to blame, we surmise that differences in 
information technology and the rise of global 
asset managers are responsible.
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